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Abstract  
In A Theory of Moral Education, Michael Hand claims that a directive moral education 
that seeks to persuade children that a particular conception of contractarian morality 
is justified can be undertaken without falling foul of the requirement not to 
indoctrinate. In this article, we set out a series of challenges to Hand’s argument. 
First, we argue that Hand’s focus on ‘reasonable disagreement’ regarding the status 
of a moral conception is a red-herring in this conception. Second, we argue that the 
endorsement of moral contractarianism and the prohibition on indoctrination pull in 
different directions: if contractarianism is sound, then teachers or governments 
should be less worried about indoctrination than Hand suggests. Third, we argue 
that moral contractarianism is mistaken; teachers should look elsewhere for guidance 
on the moral norms and principles towards which they should direct their pupils. 
 
Key words: Michael Hand; moral education; moral contractarianism; reasonable 
disagreement; indoctrination 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Well-ordered moral education demands that teachers shape the beliefs and 
motivations of children so that they come to treat others in the right way. But 
sensible people often disagree in good faith about what we owe to each other. 
Notwithstanding that disagreement, is it possible to identify a moral conception 
towards which teachers are morally permitted to direct their pupils? 
 In A Theory of Moral Education (2018a)1, Michael Hand gives an affirmative 
answer to this question. He sets out certain ‘basic moral standards’ (p.68) that, he 
argues, are almost universally endorsed and, more importantly for him, ‘robustly 
justified’ (p.59). These standards include moral prohibitions on various kinds of 
killing and harming, theft and extortion, and lying and cheating. In addition, they 
                                                        
1 Unless otherwise indicated, page references within the text are to this book. 
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include moral injunctions to interact with others fairly, honestly, and to come to the 
aid of those in need (p.68). As Hand acknowledges, his conception of morality is 
contractarian in nature, though he is at pains to emphasize an allegiance to the 
contractarianism of Hume [1777] rather than Hobbes [1651] – or at least the 
Hobbesian view elaborated by Gauthier (1986). 
 Hand claims that, because a particular version of moral contractarianism is 
sound, the directive moral education of children towards it, which aims to persuade 
children to believe that its moral prohibitions, requirements, and permissions are 
justified, can be undertaken without falling foul of the educational, and presumably 
moral, requirement not to indoctrinate. For Hand, teaching is indoctrinatory if it 
shapes a pupil’s beliefs ‘in such a way that she comes to hold them non-rationally, on 
some other basis than the force of relevant evidence and argument’ (p.6). Education 
that aims to cultivate a ‘full commitment’ to contractarian moral standards – which 
involves both the gamut of desires, intentions and reactive attitudes that together 
constitute ‘subscription’ to the standards outlined above, and also the belief that 
having these attitudes is rationally required (pp.29-43) – need not be indoctrinatory: 
because contractarian moral beliefs are robustly justified, pupils can be encouraged 
to endorse them on the basis of the conclusive case for adopting them. 
 Stated in more formal terms, and setting aside certain qualifications he 
makes, Hand’s argument is as follows: 
 
Premise 1:  It is morally permissible, and there is a weighty reason, to teach 
directively towards belief in proposition P if, and only if, given the 
arguments and evidence, P is robustly justified, that is, justified 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
Premise 2:  Given the available arguments and evidence, (Humean) moral 
contractarianism is robustly justified. 
 
Conclusion: Directive teaching towards Humean contractarianism – the kind of 
justification it offers as well as the moral norms it generates – is 
morally permissible and there is a weighty reason to engage in it. 
 
Both premises in Hand’s argument are controversial. With respect to the first, we 
might ask why the moral permissibility of directive moral education depends on 
whether the moral propositions teachers aim to impart are justified ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ (p.68). It may be the case, for instance, that some moral views 
bring about more favourable outcomes when acted upon compared with other moral 
views, even though none of them reach the threshold of being beyond reasonable 
doubt, and this might be thought a reason to teach those views directively. With 
respect to the second, we might ask whether the contractarian moral norms that 
comprise Hand’s moral code really do meet Hand’s own test of being robustly 
justified. 
 Hand’s argument raises two more general issues. The first concerns the 
compatibility of moral contractarianism with the moral prohibition of indoctrination. 
His insistence that education is, and should be, ‘centrally concerned with the 
transmission of knowledge’ (pp.85-86) seems to sit uneasily with a contractarian 
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view of what we owe to each other. Second, even if Hand has a reply to this tension, 
if contractarianism turns out to be mistaken, it is a further question whether the 
correct conception of morality (and political morality) would forbid all 
indoctrination, as Hand understands it. It may turn out that, on a more plausible 
conception of morality, some forms of fostering subscription to moral standards on a 
non-rational basis are not morally objectionable. 
 We do not discuss all these issue here. Rather, we focus on (a) the second 
premise and (b) the tension between contractarianism and a non-indoctrination 
stance towards education. We argue that Hand has not done enough to show that 
moral contractarianism satisfies his own standard of justification; and we explore the 
uneasy relationship between moral contractarianism and Hand’s anti-indoctrinatory 
approach to education. Before elaborating these challenges, we begin, in the next 
section, by offering some clarificatory remarks about the nature of Hand’s 
conception of moral education by discussing the role of ‘reasonable disagreement’ in 
it and contrasting his account with those advanced by followers of Rawls. 
 So, in this contribution, we set out a series of challenges to Hand’s conception 
of moral education. Even if our challenges are successful, readers should not take 
them to question the value of Hand’s work. His book is terrific. It is a model of how 
to write in the philosophy of education: clear in conception, free of jargon, 
analytically subtle, and packed with interesting and controversial arguments. 
Without doubt, anyone who wants to write seriously about moral education must 
engage with Hand’s fascinating view. 
 
2. The red herring of ‘reasonable disagreement’ in Hand’s view 
Before developing our challenges to Hand’s argument, we begin by clarifying the 
status and relevance of ‘reasonable disagreement’ in his view. This is important 
because the idea of reasonable disagreement appears to do some heavy lifting in his 
argument for moral justification and the impermissibility of indoctrination. 
However, we will argue that this is not in fact the case, and that references to 
reasonable disagreement obscure what is really central in his work. 
When setting out his account of indoctrination and permissible directive 
education (pp.2-5), Hand makes reference to the fact of reasonable disagreement 
with regard to both the content and justification of morality: ‘Teaching propositions as 
true, or standards as justified, when there is reasonable disagreement about them, is 
indoctrinatory’ (p.5, emphasis added). However, it is important to draw a distinction 
between two different understandings of the idea of ‘reasonable disagreement’ that 
might be relevant for our thinking about morality, not least because Hand’s use of 
the idea differs markedly from the way in which the idea has been deployed by 
many moral and political philosophers. 
On one account – call it the Rawlsian view – reasonable disagreement gives us 
a moral reason not to appeal to what Rawls calls ‘the whole truth’ about religion and 
ethics when defending principles of political morality and education policy (Rawls 
1996, pp.224-225). Rawls’s ‘political conception of justice’ is an example of this kind 
of view. He asks whether it is possible – for the sake of securing a stable, just society 
– to defend a conception of political morality that rises above the countless 
controversies that exist between ‘reasonable’ or ‘free and equal citizens’. Even on this 
conception, it should be noted, the reference to ‘reasonableness’ or ‘freedom and 
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equality’ is itself a commitment to certain controversial ideas of political morality 
involving the protection of familiar civil liberties and various socioeconomic rights. 
Nevertheless, Rawls’s project is to assess whether it is possible to defend political 
ideals and principles in a way that does not rest on any wider moral or religious 
claims that are controversial between reasonable citizens. As an example, Rawls asks 
whether the two principles of justice he defends (Rawls 1971), and the arguments for 
them, are capable of being presented in a way that rises above the disputes between, 
say, Kantians, utilitarians, and various religious views about the source of moral 
norms. This is important for Rawls, because if they live under institutions that 
protect their interests in freedom and equality, individuals reasoning in good faith 
will, because of what he calls ‘the burdens of judgement’ (1996, pp.54-58), inevitably 
come to different conclusions about these further matters concerning the content and 
justification of moral, religious and ethical norms. Given the inevitability of 
disagreement between such citizens, if everyone is to enjoy political autonomy—in 
which they ‘know and accept the pervasive influences of the basic structure that 
shape their conception of themselves, their character and ends’ (1996, p. 68)—the 
defence of the principles that regulate the basic structure cannot appeal to further 
controversial moral ideas beyond those of freedom and equality. This applies to 
citizens who make mistakes in their reasoning about religion and ethics just as much 
to those who do not. In this way, by not appealing to the whole truth, the Rawlsian 
view aims to secure agreement amongst (morally) reasonable people on certain 
principles of political morality that would be unachievable if those principles were 
defended as following from the whole truth about morality. 
 Hand is not a Rawlsian. His argument assumes that we ought to be after the 
whole truth about morality, because it is the responsibility of teachers to transmit 
knowledge (pp.85-86). Nevertheless, in his view there is a different sense of 
‘reasonable disagreement’ that is relevant—relevant because it casts doubt on a 
moral conception’s epistemic status (pp.2-5). 
 There are at least two ways in which we might understand Hand’s epistemic 
understanding of reasonable disagreement. First, we might offer a characterisation of 
an epistemically reasonable person and say that reasonable moral disagreement is 
the disagreement about morality that obtains between persons so characterised. This 
is what Hand seems to have in mind when introducing the idea: 
 
Sensible and sincere people armed with similar life experience and 
acquainted with roughly the same facts come to notably different 
conclusions about the content and justification of morality (p.1). 
 
On this view, we cannot hold a proposition to be justified if some suitably situated, 
sensible and sincere people reject it. The mere fact that there is disagreement 
between them implies that a proposition is not justified. 
 It is unlikely, however, that this is Hand’s considered view, as opposed to 
shorthand for his actual view. If it were, his argument for directive contractarian 
moral education would fail to get off the ground. True, as Hand notes, some sensible 
and sincere people do endorse moral contractarianism. But, it is not the case that 
moral contractarianism is endorsed by all sensible and sincere people; in fact, far 
from it. Many, including many of the most prominent moral philosophers of the last 
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half-century, reject moral contractarianism: Rawls (1971; 1996; 2001), Parfit (1984; 
2011), Nagel (1986; 1991), Scanlon (1998; 2016), Kamm (2007), Korsgaard (1996), 
Kagan (1989), Quinn (1993), Thomson (1998), Raz (1986), and Dworkin (2011). It is 
hard to believe that these philosophers are unreasonable, if reasonableness is 
specified in terms of the capacity to reason well. But, if we treat them as reasonable, 
which seems much more plausible, then we must accept that contractarianism is 
itself subject to reasonable disagreement. Unless there is some knock-down 
argument in favour of moral contractarianism which these thinkers have missed – 
which we doubt, and in the final section we will review cases where 
contractarianism seems particularly weak in comparison with non-contractarian 
views – then what follows from this is that to teach contractarianism and what 
follows from it directively would count as indoctrination, on Hand’s view. 
 There is, however, a different way of understanding the connection between 
disagreement about a proposition and its justification. This second interpretation is, 
we believe, Hand’s real view. To understand this alternative interpretation, we 
should begin by noting that even sensible and sincere individuals who are 
acquainted with all the available facts and arguments can still make mistakes. What 
fundamentally casts doubt on the justification of a moral proposition is not the bare 
fact that people who have the capacity to reason well disagree with it, but that there 
exist alternative conclusions that are consistent with the available evidence and 
arguments (p.3). Hand gives several examples of moral propositions that are not 
‘robustly justified’ in the sense that only one conclusion is consistent with the 
available evidence: the claims that eating meat (p.3), smacking children (p.3), giving 
offence (pp.92-99), and buying expensive private schooling for one’s child (pp.99-
103) are morally prohibited. In each of these cases, Hand argues that the available 
evidence and arguments can be used to support the moral permissibility as well as 
the moral wrongness of those activities. In other words, claims that these activities 
are morally prohibited have uncertain justificatory status, because the evidence and 
arguments do not uniquely support these judgments.  
 If this is indeed Hand’s view, then the idea of reasonable disagreement is an 
unhelpful distraction in his argument, because the existence of disagreement is 
ultimately neither here nor there. At most, the existence of disagreement between 
good reasoners points toward the possibility that a moral code might not be robustly 
justified, but such disagreement does not make it the case that the moral code is not 
justified. Worries about the justification of a view suggested by the fact of 
disagreement are defeasible, because even sensible and sincere reasoners sometimes 
make mistakes. Similarly, an absence of disagreement about a moral code does not 
make that moral code justified. As Hand notes, consensus on a moral conception 
might be explained by factors other than the ‘demands of reason’ (p.77), such as post 
hoc rationalisation of a moral code into which we have been socialised (p.58). 
This explains why our reconstruction of Hand’s argument makes no 
reference to disagreement, reasonable or otherwise. His real argument is that 
teachers ought to direct their pupils in the right way towards moral norms that are 
robustly justified. That remains the case, he claims, even if many clever, sincere and 
respectful people reject the norms towards which pupils are directed. His view is 
very different from Rawlsian accounts that aspire to find educational principles that 
are acceptable to citizens who disagree about religious, ethical and certain moral 
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matters. Although we will not defend it here, we find the Rawlsian view more 
appealing as an approach to education in schools (see Clayton & Stevens 2018). 
 With these observations about the unimportance of reasonable disagreement 
in Hand’s argument in place, we now turn to consider more directly the claims he 
makes about moral contractarianism.  
 
3. Should moral contractarians worry so much about indoctrination? 
Are the two central ideas that animate Hand’s conception of moral education – his 
concerns about indoctrination and his moral contractarianism – mutually 
supportive? True, there is no logical inconsistency. Nevertheless, both concerns are 
normative in nature – they are, or produce, reasons for action – and it is not obvious 
that the reasons hang together. In this section, we suggest that if moral 
contractarianism is sound, then teachers or governments should not be as worried 
about indoctrination as Hand suggests they should be. It is important to note, it is 
not our aim to argue that indoctrination is not worrying; only that if one accepts, 
arguendo, the case for contractarianism, then it is not obvious that a strong 
prohibition on indoctrination can be maintained. 
 To see this tension, we need, first, to outline Hand’s contractarian view. Hand 
sketches moral contractarianism by reference to what Hume and others call the 
‘circumstances of justice’ and what Hand calls the ‘problem of sociality’ (pp.60-66). 
The circumstances of justice consist of three features: (i) a rough equality between 
individuals in terms of their ability to help or harm others; (ii) individuals are 
motivated by a concern to pursue their self-regarding goals, but also their goals 
involving others – they have some concern for others, particularly those close to 
them; and (iii) the world is such that individuals benefit from cooperation with 
others to pursue their goals. 
 Given these facts, and the standing tendency for individuals to free ride on 
the cooperative activity of others, which would be collectively worse, Hand provides 
a summary of how contractarians justify moral restrictions, which he helpfully 
characterises in terms of norms that apply to everyone (‘universally-enlisting’) and 
that involve a commitment to penalise oneself and others for transgressions 
(‘penalty-endorsing’). Widespread subscription to moral standards that are ‘conflict-
averting’ and ‘cooperation-sustaining’ solves the problem of sociality (p.67).  
 With this basic sketch of contractarianism in place, we can now illustrate the 
tension between Hand’s contractarianism and his strict prohibition on 
indoctrination. Recall, for Hand, indoctrination consists in imparting beliefs to 
people such that they hold them without appreciating the reasons for so doing. 
However, if the aim of the contractarian is to bring about subscription to moral 
standards in order to avert socially detrimental conflict and to sustain cooperation, 
then it is not obvious why indoctrination is ruled out. In some cases, indoctrination 
may be an effective way of securing peaceful cooperation. 
 This tension can be further revealed by noting that Hand distinguishes 
between ‘moral formation’, which involves shaping people’s intentions, desires and 
behaviour, and different kinds of ‘moral inquiry’, which concerns individuals’ beliefs 
regarding the justification of those moral standards (pp.16-19). A full moral 
commitment, then, requires both parts: that we subscribe to moral standards, and we 
believe those standards to be fully justified. On Hand’s view, the principle of non-
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indoctrination refers only to the latter – belief-formation – element: it is valuable for 
individuals to hold the beliefs they do because they appreciate the reasons for them, 
rather than holding them non-rationally (such as through deference to putative 
authorities, or by being nudged or manipulated into holding beliefs without 
attention to the available evidence or argument). 
 As part of holding this distinction open, Hand accepts that children’s 
intentions, desires, and behaviour – their moral formation – can permissibly be 
shaped without them appreciating the reasons for these attitudes and conduct, 
provided that this shaping helps them to conform with the right moral code (pp.30-
37). Typically, this formation occurs through such things as issuing prescriptions 
(pp.30-32), rewarding compliance (p.32), punishing non-compliance (pp.32-33), and 
the modelling of compliance on the behaviour of others (pp.33-34). These methods of 
formation are primarily ‘conative, affective and behavioural’, rather than (in contrast 
to moral inquiry) cognitive (p.35).  
 But, if such shaping of intentions, desires, and behaviour is permissible in 
order to help individuals conform with the right moral code, why not also allow the 
cultivation of non-rationally held beliefs? Given that how individuals act is often 
explained by their beliefs about how they ought to act, achieving the goal of peaceful 
cooperation might be more effectively met by holding the right beliefs in a non-
rational manner, rather than trying to bring individuals to hold the right beliefs for 
the right reasons. 
 Such a thought, we might note, is not outlandish, historically, amongst 
contractarians. Concerned with how to mitigate conflict and produce cooperation, 
contractarians have allowed the community to engage in just this kind of belief-
formation. For example, one of the powers Hobbes attributes to the Sovereign is: 
 
to be Judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what 
conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, 
and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of 
people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they 
be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; 
and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing 
of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord (Hobbes [1651], 
p.124). 
 
We have, according to the problem of sociality, compelling reasons to cultivate both 
beliefs and desires that support peace and cooperation for mutual advantage. The 
case for non-indoctrination is not settled by anything internal to the contractarian 
view; it is an open question whether that cultivation should take the form of trying to 
get individuals to appreciate the reasons for the beliefs they have. It is by no means 
obvious that the circumstances that are necessary for cooperation can be successfully 
brought about or maintained through reasoned argumentation. Perhaps things such 
as irony, propaganda, and eloquence are more effective than a policy of non-
indoctrinatory persuasion in which everyone is given the opportunity to appreciate 
the arguments for alternative conclusions that some find persuasive.  
Hand’s worries about indoctrination are not fully articulated or defended 
from a contractarian point of view. At one point, he agrees with Mill that holding 
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beliefs because one takes there to be reasons for them makes those beliefs more 
amenable to revision and improvement (pp.6-7, 10). 
To be sure, it is clear why Millian consequentialists are hostile to 
indoctrination. For Mill, the quashing of dissenting views and debate that 
indoctrination inflicts has a series of undesirable effects, which include individuals 
becoming unable to discover the truth, them making that truth, once discovered, a 
part of their lives, and reducing people to mere automatons, only capable of 
imitating and copying, which is an existence at odds with being the progressive 
beings that the political community should facilitate (see Mill [1859]). It is less clear 
why contractarians should care about these effects. This is particularly the case if, as 
some contractarians argue, mutually advantage cooperation tends to be more stable 
if people exhibit a conservative attitude and more deference to those in positions in 
authority rather than less (Hume 1777). Inquisitive and independently-minded 
people do not obviously cooperate for mutual advantage better than those who defer 
to social expectations and conventions without serious examination of their 
justification.  
 At another point, Hand argues that non-rationally held beliefs might be more 
unstable (p.10). Such beliefs are intimately linked with the power-structures that 
impart and maintain them. Hand claims that those who are indoctrinated into 
beliefs, such as their parents’ religious beliefs, often cast them off when they reach 
adulthood, not because they examine those beliefs and find them wanting, but 
because they react negatively to the control itself. Once such beliefs go – along with 
the control that maintained them – then the appropriate moral standards for 
maintaining peaceful cooperation are less likely to be secured. As an empirical claim 
about religious enrolment, this is open to considerable doubt. Renouncing one’s 
parents’ religious views upon reaching maturity certainly occurs, but considerable 
empirical evidence shows that many who cast off their parents’ views do not leave 
the religious life entirely. Rather, they ‘switch’ to different denominations, whilst still 
maintaining related beliefs. Often the direction of travel is from particularly ‘strict’ or 
conservative religious doctrines to more ‘moderate’ or liberal ones, but the reverse 
often occurs as well (see Sherkat and Wilson 1995; Loveland 2003). Either way, the 
seeds rarely fall far from the tree. Moreover, when they do fall it is more commonly 
from the less strict denominations. Contra Hand, those who are enrolled during 
childhood into strict religious beliefs on a non-rational basis prove to have 
remarkably stable religious preferences (Sherkat and Wilson 1995). 
 So far, we have examined the critique of indoctrination as a claim internal to 
contractarianism. It might be, however, that this is not Hand’s view. He seems, at 
times, to present the objection to indoctrination as independent of the truth of moral 
contractarianism. This interpretation is suggested by occasional remarks about the 
point of education – that it is ‘centrally concerned with the transmission of 
knowledge’ (pp.85-86) – and ‘educational propriety’ (p.121). On this view, it is 
morally impermissible to indoctrinate, because indoctrination is inimical to the 
transmission and development of knowledge. But, this hybrid view in which there 
are non-contractarian reasons to be concerned about indoctrination raises further 
questions. 
 First, we might ask questions about the justification of teachers’ duty not to 
indoctrinate. The claim cannot be merely that indoctrination does not square with 
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the meaning of education, because in that case we may ask why we are morally 
required to pursue the project of education so construed. Millian concerns about 
close-mindedness seem more promising reasons, but these suggest a more general 
outlook that favours the cultivation of individual autonomy, individuality, and 
liberty for the sake of social progress. Again, these do not seem to square with the 
contractarian framework Hand outlines, and we are left asking questions about the 
character of the overarching view. 
 Relatedly, if non-contractarian reasons for the moral permissibility of 
indoctrination are accepted, questions arise about how well they cohere with 
contractarian concerns. Suppose there were contractarian reasons to indoctrinate and 
independent reasons not to do so. We would need an account of how to manage 
conflict between these two sets of reasons. Moreover, a non-contractarian theory that 
supports a prohibition on indoctrination might be in tension with other parts of the 
contractarian view. For example, if Mill or Rawls are right about the value of 
individuals exercising the capacity to track the truth about certain aspects of 
morality, then it might be worth risking some social conflict or some loss of the 
smooth functioning of a society, beloved of contractarians, to realise that value.  
Accepting a non-contractarian basis for the prohibition of indoctrination 
would open Hand’s argument to further challenges, because it is unlikely that he can 
justify only one exception to contractarianism. If there are non-contractarian reasons, 
then it is necessary to do more than merely explain how contractarian reasons 
support certain moral norms; Hand needs to establish that the contractarian reasons 
are not defeated by other sound non-contractarian reasons, such as, for example, 
respect for people’s dignity or treating individuals with equal concern. As we shall 
elaborate in the next section, one of the long-standing criticisms of contractarian 
moral and political theory is that it gives insufficient weight to the moral claims of 
the vulnerable. If Hand allows non-contractarian reasons into his account, then it is 
difficult to see how he can maintain that directive moral education should aim to 
impart a full commitment to the basic moral code he has in mind. 
 
4. Is directive contractarian moral education justified? 
In this final section, we challenge the plausibility of moral contractarianism. Recall 
that Hand’s position is that moral education that directs pupils towards a particular 
set of moral norms is permissible if, but only if, those norms are robustly justified. 
Using contractarian ideas, he sketches a justification of a basic moral code that 
includes moral prohibitions on certain kinds of killing, physical harm, theft, 
extortion, and cheating, as well as moral requirements to deal with others honestly 
and fairly, and to help people – particularly those close to us – who are in need. 
Because he takes that basic moral code to be robustly justified he argues that it is 
morally permissible to teach in a way that produces a full moral commitment to it. 
With respect to other moral claims – those that defend moral prohibitions on 
smacking children, giving offence, and buying private schooling for one’s child – he 
claims that the prohibitions have not been justified beyond reasonable doubt – they 
are the ‘grey areas of morality’ (p.82) – and, therefore, should be taught non-
directively, that is, without teachers aiming to get pupils to believe that the 
prohibitions are justified. Hand also has a third category of views: those that are 
unjustified (pp.84-87). In this category he places views that morally forbid 
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masturbation, or hold that the moral permissibility of actions turns on whether they 
are ‘natural’ (pp.84-85). Here teachers are permitted to teach directively that these 
moral standards and justificatory arguments are rationally indefensible. 
 Our first challenge to this contractarian view is simply this: Hand has not 
done enough to establish his claim that the basic moral code he advocates for 
directive teaching is justified. Our second challenge is to argue that the kind of 
morality contractarians favour is unjustified. 
 Regarding the first challenge, Hand needs to offer readers considerably more 
argument if he is to establish that his basic moral code is sound. We have covered 
part of this point above. A significant number of the world’s most prominent moral 
philosophers over the past fifty years (if not longer) reject moral contractarianism. 
The fact that they reject it may only have evidential significance with regard to 
contractarianism’s soundness – it points toward the possibility that the view may not 
be robustly justified. Nevertheless, their accounts of morality contain a several 
forceful objections to the contractarian view of the nature and justification of reasons 
for action and what these imply for the moral norms we should respect. If a view is 
justified by being the only rational conclusion that can be drawn from the available 
evidence and arguments, then it is important to explore and rebut at least the most 
prominent alternative arguments in the field. Hand needs to offer us considerably 
more to establish that contractarian morality is justified beyond reasonable doubt. 
 With regard to the second challenge, here we briefly sketch a couple of 
arguments that purport to show that contractarianism is mistaken. To be fair to 
Hand, he does address some objections to the contractarian view, albeit briefly – 
those that may be raised by nihilists (pp.70-72), free-riders (pp.72-73), and the infirm 
(pp.74-75). However, he does not offer a conception, still less a justification, of the 
account of reasons for action from which contractarian morality is supposed to 
follow, and he does not deal adequately with the plight of those who may be 
disadvantaged because they are vulnerable. 
 Let us consider the account of reasons for action first. Hand says that, given 
the circumstances of justice and the problem of sociality they tend to generate, 
human beings have decisive reasons to subscribe to the moral norms he outlines. 
Hand does not supply an account of the nature of reasons for action, but we can 
explore the most plausible possible accounts. Historically, contractarians have 
favoured some kind of desire conception of reasons. On this account, reasons tell us 
what actions are necessary or sufficient to realise our desires. Our fundamental 
desires cannot be evaluated as good or bad; desires are taken as given, and what is 
good or bad for an individual depends on her desires. Contractarians like Hobbes 
and Hume, then, proceed on the basis of a subjective account of a person’s good, and 
an instrumental account of reasons in which reasons tell us how to realise our desire-
determined good. 
 It is unclear whether Hand adopts the desire conception of reasons that is 
characteristic of many contractarian theories. If he does, his account of justified moral 
norms appears suspect, for it says nothing about a requirement that our beliefs and 
desires be rational in a more substantive sense. For instance, Parfit’s case of an 
individual whose desires include ‘future-Tuesday indifference to pain’ is a simple 
example that undermines the account (1984). Parfit asks us to imagine someone who 
has the desire to avoid pain in the future, but is indifferent to pain occurring on any 
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future Tuesday (though when it is Tuesday he has a strong desire to avoid pain on 
that day). Here, we might ask whether an individual with future-Tuesday 
indifference to pain has a reason for her desire. 
Many philosophers –Parfit (2011, vol. 2), Scanlon (2016), and Dworkin (2011) 
included– adopt a non-naturalist account of reasons, and argue that reasons can be 
fundamental. If they are right, then we need to do more than rest our moral code on 
generalisations about the fundamental desires individuals have, as contractarians 
typically do. For example, an individual’s desire for self-preservation or 
‘commodious living’, or limited sympathy, cannot be taken as immune from 
evaluation. Rather, we need to ask whether there are considerations that count in 
favour of having these ambitions such that an action-guiding code that serves them 
is justified. 
 Even this brief sketch indicates a strong case can be made that contractarians 
have an impoverished view of reasons for action. Relatedly, a compelling case can be 
made against the moral code they endorse. Contractarians conceive moral rules as 
rules for the production of mutually advantageous interaction between roughly 
equal people. However, as Hand notes, many object to contractarianism because it 
appears not to issue moral prohibitions on individuals who propose to harm those 
who lack the means to help or hinder them. Contractarians, that is, defend moral 
norms of reciprocal cooperation that benefit individuals who interact with others 
who can help and harm each other. But, on that view, powerful individuals with 
little to gain or fear from others would lack moral duties to refrain from harming or 
helping them. Such a moral code is one without a sense of the dignity of human life: 
it permits the strong to trample over the interests and claims of those whom we often 
think possess the strongest moral claims to assistance – the vulnerable.  
 Hand offers two replies to this objection. First, he claims that the objection 
underestimates the ability of the so-called vulnerable to set back or advance the 
interests of others, because there is no straightforward way of sorting people into 
two distinct groups of the ‘infirm’ and the not infirm: infirmities or vulnerabilities 
vary, so although someone may not be able to cause harm in one way, they may in 
another; and that some infirmities are temporary, so if someone is unable to cause us 
harm now, they may be able to at some future time (p.74). These are practical or 
prudential considerations. Second, the vulnerable are protected because, as a matter 
of fact, humans possess (limited) sympathy: the mutually advantageous morality of 
contractarians must be understood as moral norms that enable individuals to satisfy 
their desires that others not suffer, not merely their self-regarding desires. 
 Neither of these replies seems adequate. To see why, consider a moral idea 
that is routinely taught directively in schools, the idea of sustainability—that future 
generations have a moral claim to enjoy as good an opportunity to pursue their goals 
as the present generation enjoys—which supports a duty not to deplete the world’s 
natural resources and to prevent global warming. Given the impossibility of time 
travel, it cannot be argued that distant future generations have the ability to help or 
hinder the interests of the present generation. Even if Hand’s first reply to what he 
calls the objection on behalf of the infirm works for currently vulnerable persons, 
which we doubt, it does not work at all for distant future generations. Such future 
generations form a group that is separate and distinct; there is no form of action 
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available to them at all that would harm or hinder previous distant generations; and 
their vulnerability is permanent, not temporary. 
 So, Hand’s case for directively teaching a moral requirement of sustainability 
must rest on the contingent fact of sympathy for the suffering of distant future 
generations. Given his acceptance of a limited sympathy that exhibits a spatial and, 
presumably, a temporal discount rate (p.61), this straightforwardly generates a 
seemingly insurmountable problem for a contractarian defence of sustainability. 
Hand’s account of morality cannot justify encouraging children to believe that they 
are morally required to act in ways that leave enough and as good for distant future 
generations. The poverty of contractarian morality is that it fails to accord equal or 
adequate protection to vulnerable future generations whose prospective indigence 
does not happen to trigger the sympathy of the strong. 
 In the face of objections of this kind, Hand sometimes retreats to the claim 
that he is providing only a partial account of moral education. He is open to the 
suggestion that the moral code he affirms is not complete, and might be augmented 
by further moral standards, if there are robust justifications for them, and that there 
may be other justifications for subscribing to moral standards (p.69; 2018b, p.7). 
Hence, he might be persuaded that there is no plausible argument against the moral 
requirement of sustainability. If so, teachers may teach directively towards a belief in 
it alongside a belief in the moral prohibitions against killing, harm, theft, and so on. 
 The problem with this argumentative strategy is that it relies upon the 
assumption that the moral code Hand sets out is a proper subset of the – as yet 
unspecified – complete moral code. That is, if we take the complete moral code of 
robustly justified norms, Hand’s code will be contained within that complete code, 
and the prohibitions on killing, harm, theft, and so on, will not conflict with any of 
those further justified norms that comprise the full code. Yet, it is hard to believe that 
this strategy will work, because there is a basic tension between ‘morality as rules for 
mutual advantage’ and ‘morality as impartial treatment’ as defended by Kantians 
and many consequentialists (see Barry 1989). This is the case for both the content and 
the justification of their respective moral codes. On a Kantian view, for example, 
every person or rational agent is entitled to be treated according to principles that no 
one can reasonably reject regardless of whether she can help or hinder other agents 
(Scanlon 1998; Rawls 1996; Nagel 1986, 1991). Impartial act consequentialists argue 
that individuals are morally required to act in ways that produce the best 
consequences, where good consequences consist of one or more goods such as need-
fulfilment, equality, impartial concern for well-being (Parfit 2011), and so on. These 
views do not simply agree with the contractarian views of how to justify moral 
principles and make additional arguments that supplement the code. Rather, they 
emphatically reject the contractarian conception of reasons and its other foundational 
thoughts about morality.  
 The same is the case for the content of morality. True, non-contractarian 
moral philosophers generally agree that harm and theft are morally prohibited, and 
they agree that it is right that children are encouraged to treat others fairly. 
Nevertheless, they offer different interpretations of these moral ideas that conflict 
with those offered by contractarians. This point is obscured in Hand’s argument 
because he does not give us a full description of what he means by ‘harm’, ‘theft’, 
and ‘fair treatment’. Still, an example will suffice to illustrate the tension. Most who 
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take morality to be about impartiality argue for a conception of fair treatment that 
attaches priority to satisfying the interests of the least advantaged. They might do so 
because they are persuaded by the thought that everyone is entitled to enough; or 
that the claims of the least advantaged matter more, or are more urgent, from a 
moral point of view; or that we are required to treat people as equals. It is hard to see 
how contractarians can accept these thoughts. For contractarians, moral rules, as we 
have seen, regulate conduct for mutual advantage: for a moral rule to be justified it 
needs to be shown how the requirement enables everyone, including the powerful, 
to pursue their self-regarding and (limited) other-regarding goals more effectively 
than not having that moral requirement. Contractarianism, then, produces a moral 
code of ‘I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine, or if I happen to care about your 
welfare’. It has no place for the more basic moral requirement ‘I should scratch your 
back if you can’t scratch it yourself and even if you can’t scratch mine, regardless of 
whether I happen to care about your welfare’. In situations where there exists a 
rough equality between the contracting parties, moral contractarianism may well 
give rise to a set of rules that sometimes corresponds to, or overlaps with, those of 
morality as impartiality conceptions. Within contemporary societies the rules that 
apply to productive members who contribute to the collective enterprise would 
likely correspond in this way. But, where this rough equality fails to exist – in the 
cases of the ‘infirm’ or the vulnerable, or those of different generations who are 
unable to harm us – then this correspondence will decrease substantially. 
 If we are right, Hand cannot retreat to a stance of open-mindedness about the 
defensibility of further moral rules to save his view from the charge that it fails the 
vulnerable. We are forced to choose between Hand’s contractarian conception of 
moral education and alternative accounts that rest on the fundamental idea that 
everyone must be treated with impartial concern and respect. In the face of that 
choice, teachers and other moral educators should reject moral contractarianism. 
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